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Subsidies  in Brazil essentially  serve three  Second,  some carrots  are better  than others
purposes:  at achieving  the government's  objectives.  In
general, a state abatement  subsidy  is the more
o  Assigned  to the right  level of government,  effective  instrument  to combine with a pollution
they  cou. I reinforce  the effectiveness  of pollu-  tax. But when federal  or state inspection  capa-
tion taxes  in reducing  pollution.  bilities  are limited,  monitoring  subsidies  may be
an effective  substitute.
* They offer an opportunity  for additional
combinations  of instruments  and hence  more  Third,  increasing  abatement  subsidy  rates
flexibility  in dealing with the specific  institu-  can be counterproductive  - tending  to increase
tional characteristics  of every  state.  firm investment  more than  necessary  and hence
reduce  the pollution  tax base, while  increasing
* They can serve a purely "public  relations"  subsidy  costs. This can worsen  the monitoring
effect by showing  that the federal  government  and inspection  efforts and fiscal revenue.
does not always rely on "sticks" but can also
provide  "carrots."  Finally, it is more  effective  to keep subsidy
rates low if they are to be effective  and sustain-
Estache and Zheng  have four  main messages  able and at the same time get the endorsement
of relevance  to the Brazilian  economy.  needed  from state and federal  fiscal administra-
tions.
First, carrots will not work without  a stick.
Subsidies  of any type will not work  without  a
coexisting  pollution  tax.
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I.  Introduction
A recent survey of the use of economic instruments for environmental
protection  in OECD  countries  shows that  governments  frequently  rely on
subsidies to meet their environmental policy objectives.'  Increasingly,
environmental  subsidies  a-e  also  relied  upon  in  many  industrializing
countries.  In India, Korea,  Mexico,  Singapore and  Taiwan  for  instance,
investments  in pollution abatement  equipment and facilities  can benefit
from  accelerated  depreciation  or  tax  credits. 2 Also,  in  Brazil,  the
Philippines and India, the federal governments try to stimulate investment
in abatement by providing subsidized credit to large polluters.
These subsidies are often viewed as a substitute to monitoring.  The
idea is that if a firm gets paid to control pollution, the government will
spend  less  in  monitoring  to  ensure  that  the  firm  complies  with  the
environmental law. In sum, the governments behave as if they were facing a
trade-off between:  (i) a one time expenditures on sharing the cost of an
abatement  investment  with  a  firm  and  (ii)  recurrent  and  capital
expenditures on monitoring and enforcing for as long as the firm takes to
update  it  production  technology.  The  more  difficult  and  expensive
monitoring is, the more attractive subsidies are likely to be.
A second reason why governments frequently rely on subsidies is more
1  see Opschoor and Vos (1989), pp74-88 and 116-117.
2  see Clarke, S.F. (1991).political. 3 Since for many of the older, more polluting, firms, changes in
environmental regulation took place after their  investment decision was
made, the governments are reluctant to require an immediate compliance with
new environmental laws. This aspect of the instrument selection process is
actually  all  the  more  important  in  countries  such  as  Brazil,  where
investment decisions were  often  distorted by  regional  and  sectoral tax
incentives granted by the federal and state governments.
For instance, industrial activity in the metropolitan area of Belo
Horizonte, the capital of the State of Minas Gerais in Brazil, is highly
concentrated  in the  municipality  of  Contagem.  For  the  last  20 years,
Contagem has been one of the main industrial employers of the state and a
large share of the state tax revenue is credited to production within its
borders. Now that the awareness of, and hence accountability for, the cost
of pollution has improved in the State, the successive state governments
have been torn between the need to address the health  risks  imposed by
industrial pollution and the risks of losing employment and tax revenue as
firms that  cannot  afford to comply  in the  short run with  the new  laws
disappear.
The policy issues implied by this example are typical and important
for a decentralized economy in  which the federal government relies on state
governments to enforce minimum ambient standards for water and air quality.
These policy choices are as follows. Should the sta.  '  government subsidize
the firms? Should it tax the firms' pollution to force them to internalize
the costs they  have  so  far imposed on society? Or,  should  the  federal
government step in if the state government cannot make up its mind? If the
federal government steps in, now should it do it, should it subsidize the
firms, should it subsidize monitoring by the state or should it penalize
the state for not enforcing the pollution control laws?
These are the issues we address in this paper. They result  from the
strategic nature of the decision making process  in pollution  control in
Brazil and are hence  best analyzed within a  game-theoretical  framework.
3 There are other types of arguments in the literature. For instance, see
Laplante (1990),  were a case for subsidy is  made to eliminate collusive outcomes
in an oligopolistic industry.
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This framework updates the one we used in a previous paper to discuss the
assignment of pollution based taxes and fines across government  levels. 4
Essentially,  the  framework  focuses  on  the  hierarchized  vertical
reletionship  between  the  Federal  Environmental  Agency  (FEPA),  a
representative State Environmental  Agency (SEPA)  and a  representative firm.
The main difference from the model presented in the previous paper is that
various types of subsidies have been explicitly build into the model. 5
The  characteristics  of  Brazil's  "Paper  and  Printing"  industry,  a
highly  polluting  sector,  are  relied  upon  to  illustrate  the  effects of
various  combinations  of  instruments  on  the  objectives  of  the  various
agents. In particular, we discuss the substitutability or complementarity
between: (i) federal and state abatement subsidies to firms,  (ii) federal
abatement subsidies to firms and federal monitoring  subsidies to states,
(iii) states abatement subsidies and pollution taxes,
(iv)  state  pollution  taxes  and  federal  fines  on  states,  and  (v) the
substitutability between monitoring and subsidies.
The remainder of the paper is  organized as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the main types of subsidies for pollution control. Section
3 describes how the main types of subsidies currently under consideration
in Brazil have been build into the analytical framework and presents the
main theoretical policy results that can be derived from the model. Section
4 discusses the results of simulations of various instrument combinations.
Section  5  concludes,  summarizing  the  main  policy  implications  of  the
analysis. The formal  presentation of  the model is  provided in the Appendix.
4 Estache  and  Zheng (1992)
S  In addition, there is a technical difference in that the federal
objective function  has been modelled as an explicit Lagrangian  problem to
recognize  the importance  of the federal  budget  constraint.4
2.  The Design of Subsidies for Pollution Control  6
Subsidies for pollution control are of two main types:  (i) subsidies
for emission reduction or (ii) subsidies for technological  improvements. 7
Subsidies  for  emission  reductions  are  based  on the  actual  quantity  of
emission reduction. A benchmark emission level is determined for each firm
in a given year. For each unit of emission reduction from that benchmark,
the  firm  receives  a  payment  or  reward.  From  an  individual  firm
perspective, this has the same incentive effect as a tax per unit emitted:
either the firms gets paid not to pollute or it has to pay to have the
"right" to pollute.  This  equivalence  is however misleading.  First,  the
budgetary implications of the two instruments are quite different. Second,
an  emission  based  subsidy  may  be  very  counterproductive  from  a  full
industry perspective and hence for aggregate pollution. It promotes entry
into the  sector  and  may  maintain  financially  viable  firms  that  would
otherwise  have  been  bankrupt.  This  sort  of  subsidy  is  not  commonly
considered  in developing  countries and  is then  less  interesting  from a
"pragmatic" point of view--in spite of its very impressive coverage in the
academic literature.
The  second  main  type  of subsidy consists  of  sharing  the costs  of
investing in  pollution control equipment or facilities. It is  also the type
of subsidy we are assessing in this paper. It is more commonly considered
in developing countries as it does not require a recurrent monitoring of
pollution sources, a major policy  issue in many developing countries. It
can  take  the  form  of  direct  grants,  tax  breaks  through  credits  or
accelerated  depreciation most commonly or through credit subsidies. The
instrument may  be a  very  effective way  of ensuring  quick  reduction  in
pollution control when the firm was considering to do the investment anyhow
6  For more details,  see OECD  (1989), Baumol and Oates  (1988), Fargeix
(1992) or Eskeland and Jimenez (1991).
7  A  third  type  of  subsidy  combines  characteristics  of  the  two  main
categories:  subsidies  to  inputs  substitution.  It  will  often  be  linked  to
technological changes in  the production  process, and these  will limit  some of the
distortionary incentive effects of it shares with an emission based subsidy.5
at some point and is being delayed by financial constraints.
But this type of subsidy is not problem free. For instance, abatement
subsidies typically cover the capital component of the cost and not the
recurrent  costs.  Hence,  firms  may  have  an  incentive  to  adjust  their
maintenance effort to the frequency with which they can be eligible for
abatement subsidies. Another practical problem encountered is  the excessive
specific on the subsidized technology. Often an EPA's tendency is to focus
on specific equipment types such as treatment stations, but in practice,
this may not be the most efficient method to cut pollution. 8
The final type of issue raised by technology based subsidies is the
most general and is the focus of this paper. When a firm has no intention
to invest in pollution  control unless  it is required to, the subsidy is
unlikely to be effective unless it covers the full cost of the investment.
This probably explains why, in Brazil, instruments relied upon in the past
by  the National  Development  Bank  that  are  partial  in nature,  such  as
interest rate subsidies or tax credits that reduce the tax liability by
less that the abatement cost, performed  so poorly. For a less-than-full
subsidy to be effective, additional pollution control have to be relied
upon  to make  sure  that  the overall  incentive  structure  created  by the
design of environmental policies are consistent with its objectives.
3.  The Analytical Framework
This section describes the model relied upon to assess the importance
of strategic behavior for the decision to subsidize pollution abatement in
Brazil.  It  reproduces  the  main  interactions  between  the  three  agents
involved in pollution control: the federal environmental protection agency
(FEPA),  the state environmental protection agency  (SEPA)  and the firm. The
FEPA set minimum ambient standards. The SEPA is supposed to enforce them
and has the option to improve upon them. There is  no special federal budget
allocation to the states to finance their enforcement role. The firm is
expected to comply.
8 see Fargeix (1992),  p12 on this and Baumol and  Oates (1988), footnote 6,
p213.6
The model reproduces the short run vertical relationship between the
FEPA, a representative SEPA and a representative firm. The SEPA maximizes
its  tax  revenue,  net  of  subsidies.  The  firm  maximizes  its  after  tax
profits. The FEPA is a Staukelberg leader and maximizes the social welfare
of the economy under budget constraint. The FEPA knows the SEPA and firm's
objectives but the SEPA and the firm may not be perfectly  aware of the
FEPA's intention.  They select their optimal behavior as a reaction to the
FEPA's strategy  selection. This behavior  is also  build  into the FEPA's
optimizing strategy  nd hence used to influence the SEPA's policy choices
and  hence  firm's  behavior  as  the  SEPA  is a  Stackelberg  leader  in  its
relationship with the firm.
The specific mathematical formulation of this sequence of maximizing
behavior  is  provided  in  the  appendix.  The  remainder  of  this  section
provides a brief overview of the economics underlying the behavior of each
agent  and  of  the  theoretical  policy  implications  of  various  forms  of
government intervention.
i. The Firm's Problem
The firm has a fixed capital stock it can use to produce or to abate
pollution.  Its  production  technology  is  associated  with  a  pollution
function which depends on the output level and on the abatement intensity
and technology. The costs to the firm of the investment in abatement can be
reduced  by  a  SEPA  or  FEPA  decision  to  grant  subsidies.  Unless  these
subsidies cover 100% of the investment cost, however, the firm's output,
and hence profits, will be reduced when it complies with the environmental
law. The firms's profits can also be affected by a pollution tax and the
sales tax. The pollution tax is based on emission and can only be collected
if the SEPA actually monitors the firm. From the firm's point of view, this
means that only the effective pollution tax matters. This effective tax
rate is the nominal tax rate weighted by the firm's probability  of being
monitored. If the SEPA never monitors the firm, the effective tax rate is
zero.
The  firm  has  then  to  decide  how  to allocate  its  fixed  amount  of
capital between production and pollution control to maximize its expected
profits. If the effective tax rate is zero and the subsidy, whether Federal7
or State, is less than 100%, the firm has no short run incentive to invest
in pollution control as it would lower output and hence sales revenue. As
soon as the effective pollution  tax becomes positive,  the  incentive to
invest  in  abatement  increases  as  it  can  result  in  reductions  in  the
pollution tax liability. Subsidies enhance this incentive.
The firm chooses its investment by comparing the marginal cost (MC)  of
abating pollution with the marginal benefit (MB) of doing so. The marginal
cost is reflected in the loss of after-tax profits due to the diversion of
resources from production to pollution control. It is determined by the
sales  tax and  the  investment  in abatement.  The MB  is the  savings  in
pollution tax liability achieved through the investment in abatement. This
saving depends on the efficiency of the abatement technology selected by
the firm but also on the subsidy rates for investment in abatement offered
by the FEPA and the SEPA.  Subsidies contribute to the determination of the
marginal benefit.
The solution to the firm's problem leads to these theoretical results:
Implication 1: Technology-based subsidies will increase the marginal
benefit  of  abatement  to  a  firm  as  well  as  its  profits.  Hence  these
subsidies will enhance the incentive to invest in pollution control but to
be effective, they have to be combined with a pollution tax instrument.
Implication 2: The inclusion of subsidies in the menu of pollution
control instruments allows a reduction in the minimum effective pollution
tax  rate  required  to  avoid  that  the  firm  completely  ignores  its
environmental responsibilities. Hence the SEPA can cut monitoring or the
tax rate. Alternatively, at any given level of monitoring  and tax rate,
subsidies can be used to improve the impact of the pollution tax.
Implication  3:  The  dirtier  the  industry  and  the  lower  the
effectiveness of the abatement device, the more effective monitoring is as
compared to subsidies in altering the firm's behavior.
Implication  4: From  the fiL  :.'s  perspective,  federal  subsidies  and
state  subsidies  are equally good.  They result  in a  lower  share  of  the
firm's total capital required  to fully abate pollution. Hence  subsidies
result in lower output and profit costs for a given level of reduction in
pollution as compared to a policy relying exclusively on a pollution tax.8
The first conclusion qualifies the standard tax-subsidy equivalence
result usually demonstrated in the literature for emission based subsidies
rather than for technology based subsidies. At very low levels of effective
tax  rates,  taxes  and  subsidies  are  actually  complements  rather  than
substitutes.  It  is  only  at  higher  tax  rate  levels  that  they  become
substitutes from the firm's perspective.9
From a practical point of view, it is a crucial result as in many of
the  countries  considering  subsidies  to  polluters  for  investment  in
abatement,  there  is  no  pollution  tax.  The  failure  to  combine  the
introduction of subsidies, whether from SEPA or FEPA, with the adoption of
pollution taxes, at any government level, is unlikely to prove successful
in terms of pollution reduction unless the firm already had the intention
of investing in abatement. In fact, to be conservative, the model suggests
that it is probably wiser to start  a reform in pollution management  in
Brazil with the introduction of the tax to establish the credibility of
reform  intentions.  Once  the  tax  is  being  enforced,  it makes  sense  to
consider subsidies to cut the effective tax rate.
ii.  The SEPA's problem
The state government wants to maximize the sum of sales and pollution
tax revenue net of the costs of: (i) subsidies to firms,  (ii) monitoring
the firms and (iii) fines due to the federal government if the FEPA finds
out that  the  SEPA  has  not monitored  the  firm.  The  monitoring  cost  is
assumed to be fixed. The Federal government may be willing to share the
costs of monitoring the firm by providing a subsidy for resources spent on
monitoring by the states. It represents essentially the cost of sending
people to the polluting factory and the costs of the laboratory analysis of
the samples collected. The tax and subsidy rates are imposed on the SEPA.
Or equivalently, they have to be set an identical rate for all sectors for
administrative or political reasons and can hence not bet selected as a
9  The case for tax-cum-subsidy solution for pollution control
has already been argued for in the literature. See for instance,
Yohe and MacAvoy (1987)  and for a survey of the literature on tax-
cum-subsidies Kohn(1990)9
policy  instrument  by  the authorities.  In the very  short  run,  the  only
decision variable available to the SEPA is its  monitoring frequency and the
decision on whether or not to subsidize the firm at any given  level of
subsidy rate.  In the medium  run,  it can  lobby for changes  in pollution
subsidy and tax rates.
In the  short  run,  the  SEPA  will  determine  its optimal  monitoring
choice by comparing the aggregate marginal monitoring costs and benefits.
Its total marginal monitoring cost depends on (i)  the monitoring cost; (ii)
the subsidy cost; (iii) the cost due to the reduction in the sales tax base
and (iv)  the cost due to the reduction in the pollution tax base. Its total
marginal monitoring benefit is the sum of (i)  the federal penalty avoided
and (ii) the additional pollution tax collected as a result of a harsher
monitoring.
The  SEPA's  monitoring  efforts  could  then  be  increased  by  cutting
marginal  costs  or  increasing marginal  benefits. Two  types  of  subsidies
could be considered to try to reduce total marginal cost and hence increase
the monitoring effort. The first is a subsidy to monitoring, the second is
a  reduction  in the subsidy to the firm by either the SEPA or the FEPA.
Marginal benefits would improve with an increase in pollution tax rates or
federal penalties on SEPAs. The policy implication of these observations
can be summarized as follows.
Implication 5:  As federal subsidies for monitoring increase, the SEPA
allocates more resources to controlling  pollution. The higher the  pollution
tax rate,  the monitoring  cost and the potential federal penalty on  the
SEPA,  the higher  the effect of  the federal subsidy  to the SEPA  on its
monitoring efforts. The lower the federal and state subsidies to the firm
the more the monitoring subsidy will stimulate SEPA's monitoring effort.
In addition to the obvious conclusion that a higher federal penalty
rate on the SEPA will increase the effectiveness of monitoring subsidies,
the more practical  implications of the results are somewhat unexpected.
First, the federal government should not subsidize both the firm and the
SEPA as the first instrument dampens the impact of the second one. Next, if
the  SEPA  is not  devoted  enough  to  its monitoring  requirements,  it can10
either increase the pollution tax rate on the firms (the  stick approach) or
subsidize it monitoring efforts (the carrot approach).
iii.  The FEPA's problem
The federal government  is growth oriented and thus cares about the
output  levels.  But  its  electorate  cares  about  the  environment  so  the
federal government also wants to keep pollution under control. These two
partial  objectives  are  reflected  in  the  federal  government's  overall
objective  function.  FEPA's  policies  are  designed  to  maximize  it under
budget constraint. It can be viewed as a social welfare function.
In principle,  for any given sector, FEPA's main decision variables
are: (i) its inspection effort to check how well the states do what they
are supposed to do,  (ii) the penalty level it should threaten the states
with, and  (iii) the subsidy rates to both the states and the firms. In
practice,  the  penalty  levels  and  subsidy  rates  are  often  set  for all
sectors and can hence not be used as policy variables in dealing with any
specific  sector.  In  sum,  the  only  actual  policy  variable  the  federal
government has is SEPA's inspection rate and the decision on whether or not
to subsidize the firm or the SEPA at any given subsidy rate level.
The main result of this maximization problem is that the FEPA should
pick its inspection rate to equate the marginal benefit and the marginal
cost of pollution  of  its monitoring  policy. The main  impact of federal
subsidies to the states or to the firm are obvious: they will increase the
marginal cost of monitoring and hence reduce the incentive to do so.  This
has the following implication:
Implication  6:  To  achieve a given level  of  SEPA  inspection  rate and
for a given  pollution  tax rate, the introduction  of  federal  subsidies,  to
the  firms  or  to  the states,  in  the menu  of  instruments  for  pollution
control  requires a compensating  increase in either the federal  inspection
effort  or  in  the federal  penalty  level  imposed  on  the SEPAs  for  non-
compliance  with their mandate  to control  pollution.
The model also illustrates  the importance of the budget constraint for
FEPA's choice  of optimal monitoring  effort. This  choice  is drastically11
complicated by the introduction of subsidies in the menu of instruments for
pollution control policies. In general, however, subsidies make  it more
likely that the budget constraint will be binding and may hence require
adjustments  in the  federal fine  levels  to alleviate  the  impact  of the
constraint on the optimal monitoring choice. The impact of the changes in
the shadow value of a federal budgetary improvement will thus depend on the
existing level of fines, monitoring and inspection costs and on the impact
of SEPA's monitoring on the firm's behavior. Its sign is uncertain.
The  mathematical  form  of  the  other  results  of these  optimization
problems  does  not  directly  provide  much  policy  insights.  Indeed,  its
complexity impedes the derivation of clear policy lessons for the optimal
form of FEPA's  intervention. We therefore resort to simulations to draw
some additional conclusions from the analytical framework. The results of
these simulations and their lessons are discussed in the next section.
4.  Policy Simulations
This section presents numerical simulations aiming at answering three
main questions:  (i) Should the FEPA or should the SEPA subsidize firms?
(ii) Are More  subsidies  necessarily  better?, and  (iii) Should  the FEPA
subsidize abatement by the firms or monitoring by the states? These three
questions  are  at  the  core  of  the  overall design  of  pollution  control
policies in a decentralized economy such as Brazil.
The simulations are based on a representative firm of the "Paper and
Printing" industry of Brazil. 10 The interest in this industry stems from
three main factors. First, this a typical"dirty" industry and hence one on
which environmental protection agencies frequently tend to focus on. This
implies that recurrent resources to be allocated to monitoring that sector
are  likely  to  be  higher  than  average.  Hence,  the  potential  permanent
pollution reduction benefits of a one time federal subsidies to monitoring
that sector deserve a  more detailed assessment. Second, for states in  which
the industry is large enough in terms of output, it is a clear candidate to
10  Details on the estimates of the production  functions and other data
related issues are provided in the Appendix to Estache and Zheng (1992).12
be eligible for federal or states subsidies. Finally, the potential revenue
effect of a pollution tax on emissions from this sector is high enough to
avoid  having  to  base  policy  choices  on  extremely  binding  budget
constraints.
i.  Who Should Subsidize the Firm: The Federal or State Governments?
The National  Development  Bank of  Brazil  (BNDES) has  a  program  of
subsidized credit available to highly polluting industries in a few states.
Besides the weaknesses of this program due to the limited use of pollution
taxes  in Brazil,  there  is another  characteristic  of  this  program  that
deserves some attention. Why should it be a federal subsidy program rather
than a state subsidy program?
Table 1 below reports the result of simulations comparing a federal
and  a  state  25%  subsidy  to  the  firm  for  the  purchase  of  abatement
equipment. The benchmark is  provided by the first column of the table which
reflects a case in which there are no subsidies at all. The table shows the
impact on the main  variables when the pollution  tax rate is set at its
optimal value and there are no subsidies for SEPA monitoring. The results
reported  here  are  robust.  They  hold  for  suboptimal  tax  rates  and  for
different levels of federal penalty levels on the SEPA for non-compliance.
The last line of the Table provides a summary indicator that reflects
the  choice  of  the  social  welfare  function  selected.  In particular,  it
assumes a specific level a federal disutility with regard to pollution and
a specific shadow price  for the budgetary constraint.  1'  The first major
11  The value of the marginal disutility of pollution here is 1, but the
federal inspection effort and the hence above  results are not significantly
altered for value of the marginal disutility of pollution of up to twice the
value selected here. After that, however, an increase in disutility will result
in  an increase in federal  monitoring of the SEPA. The value for the shadow  price
of the budget constraint is also 1.  The sign of the effect of a change in this
value is uncertain. It depends on its financial implications of a change in the
FEPA inspection efforts. If the combination of federal instruments result in a
self-sustained overall policy, then the FEPA could actually earn a positive net
revenue while reducing pollution. In general, however, in the more realistic
cases, FEPA's policies will lose money and hence require budgetary allocations
in is the case for the results reported in Table 1.13
conclusion is that any one of the three policy options considered will lead
to improvements over a situation in which the government does not intervene
to force the firms to internalize the costs of pollution.
The second main lesson stems from the ranking of these policy options.
The best policy is to combine a pollution tax with a state subsidy to the
firms rather than with a federal subsidy to firms. This is explained by the
incentive effect of the budgetary implications of the subsidy assignment.
As the costs of subsidies increase and their effect on pollution reduce the
pollution tax base, the states have an incentive to increase monitoring to
offset the revenue  loss that stems from these two sources. But after a
threshold monitoring level, further increases in monitoring  also lead to
lower revenue as firms tend to comply more.
Table 1: Effect on the AQents' Behavior of
a Combination of a Pollution Tax with Various Subsidies
(expressed as % of value of a variable
without government intervention unless otherwise specified)
No Subsidy  25% Federal  25%  State
Subsidy  Subsidy
to firm  to firm
Social Welfare Level  103.6%  102.5%  105.7%
Firm's Optimal Behavior
Abatement Investment
as % of Initial Capital  13.8%  11.0%  13.8%
Output Level  95.2%  96.8%  95.2%
Pollution Level  58.7%  59.3%  49.5%
Profit Level  82.7%  88.3%  86.6%
SEPA's Optimal Behavior
Minimum Monitoring Rate Required
for non-0 pollution abatement  3.4%  4.1%  4.1%
Optimal Monitoring Rate  43.1%  42.7%  52.4%
Nominal Pollution Tax Rate  2.7%  1.8%  1.8%
% cut in VAT Revenue  4.8%  3.2%  4.8%
Pollution Tax Revenue
as % of VAT Revenue  48.8%  33.0%  33.7%
Net Revenue  142.0%  127.9%  112.2%
FEPA's Optimal Behavior
Optimal Inspection Rate  0%  0%  0%14
The federal subsidy to the firms is the less effective of the three
options  even  if  it  is  likely  to  be  preferred  by  states  as  they  are
significantly better off than when they have to finance the subsidy. The
revenue loss that results from lower pollution levels is not strong enough
to  stimulate  the states  to monitor  more.  In fact,  since pollution  tax
revenue from the effective pollution tax rate follows a Laffer curve--i.e.
they peak at the optimal monitoring rate and then starts declining--,  and
since  federal subsidies  results  in lower pollution  without  the  subsidy
income effect for the state, the states have an incentive to monitor less
to collect more  tax  revenue. We will  discuss  this  explanation  is more
details in a later section. 12
Implication  5: For a given subsidy rate, a  state abatement  subsidy
reinforces the effectiveness of the  pollution tax while a federal abatement
subsidy may reduce it.
ii. Are More Subsidies Necessarily Better?
The previous section established the superiority of the state subsidy
policy option over a policy that would rely exclusively on a pollution tax.
It did not, however, establish this result for all levels of subsidies.
Table 2 illustrates the effect of various levels of state subsidies on the
behavior of the three agents. They were computed under the assumption that
the pollution tax rate was set at its optimal level. But the main policy
conclusions would not be altered if rates were set at sub-optimal levels.
These simulations  illustrate the limitations  of subsidies  stemming
from Implication 4. It  was already clear from the theoretical analysis that
a  full subsidy to the firm, whether  from the state or from the  federal
12  The optimal  federal  inspection  rate is 0 because  the incentive  effect
of the pollution  tax is aufficient  to convince  the SEPA to monitor  this dirty
industry.  As shown  in the  earlier  paper,  optimal  federal  inspection  rates  are
higher  for  cleaner  industry  as  the  potential  revenue  effect  of  a  state  pollution
tax is compelling  for  the states  and  require  a federal  involvement.15
government,  would  be self defeating.  1 3 The  90% subsidy  simulation  shows
that states subsidies are more effective than federal subsidies. But  it
also shows, that it could be a revenue disaster for the states. This is
confirmed by the 50% subsidy simulation.
Table 2: Importance of the Subsidy Level for its Effectiveness
(expressed as % of value of a variable
without government intervention unless otherwise specified)
State Subsidy  Federal  Subsidy
Level  Level
25%  50%  90%  25%  50%  9t
Social Welfare Level  105.7% 110.5%  121.1%  102.5% 100.7%  10XA
Firm's Optimal Behavior
Abatement Investment
as % of Initial Capital  13.8%  15.9%  4.6%  11.0%  7.6%  0A
Output Level  95.2%  93.7%  99.3%  96.8%  98.4  100%
Pollution Level  49.5%  20.4%  3.8%  59.7%  61.8%  100%
SEPA's Optimal Behavior
Minimum Monitoring Rate Required
for Abatement to Start  4.1%  5.5%  20.3%  4.1%  5.5%  20.3%
Optimal Monitoring Rate  52.4%  80.7%  100%  42.7%  41.6%  8.7%
Nominal Pollution Tax Rate  1.8%  1.0%  0.1%  1.8%  1.0%  0.0%
% cut in VAT Revenue  4.8%  6.3%  0.7%  3.2%  1.6%  0.0%
Pollution Tax Revenue
as % of VAT Revenue  33.7%  11.6%  0.2%  33.0%  18.2%  0.0%
Net Revenue  112.2%  52.0%  -33.8%  127.9%  114.6%  100%
The 90% subsidy simulations also provide some additional  insights.
They show that when the firms are asked to contribute even, very modestly,
13 The mod,  can actually not predict the firm optimal behavior under full
subsidization because there is a time inconsistency problem, not handled in its
design. In  practice, if the FEPA notices that the firms  do not take advantage of
the subsidy offer, it knows it will it has to improve monitoring. The analysis
of this better use of information requires a dynamic framework for mechanism
design with incentive compatibility.16
say 10%, to the cost of abatement, they will only do so when the state has
an incentive to monitor the firms. When the federal government  subsidies
the firms, its optimal policy is not to monitor the SEPA. This is turn will
reduce the incentive of SEPAs to inspect the firms. Since firms need to
face a monitoring rate of at least 20.3% to start abating and since the
revenue maximizing monitoring  rate  is only 8.7% when  the FEPA does  not
check on the SEPA, the firms have no incentive to take abate at all.
While the federal "social welfare function" indicates that the society
is better off with an increase in the state subsidy rate and worse off with
an increase in federal subsidy rates, an analysis of the individual results
raises some concerns about their immediate policy value. Most importantly,
it shows that the revenue implication of too high a  state  subsidy are
unbearable. The assignment of pollution control responsibilities would end
up reducing the state's net revenue quite significartly. This in turn would
mean that improvements in pollution control would have to be achieved by
crowding  out  other  expenditures  at  the  state  level  or  by  increasing
deficits.
It  is  thus  politically  unrealistic  to  expect  any  form  of  state
endorsement  for full subsidies.  The states  behavior would  end up being
driven by an attempt to minimize losses from pollution control activities
rather than by an attempt to maximize revenue. A proposal for this sort of
subsidy is unlikely to receive support from decentralized governments.
While states will tend to prefer a federal subsidy to a state subsidy,
they are also likely to have some views on the federal subsidy level. In
general, they will  prefer  to have  low subsidy rates  as the  higher  the
subsidy, the lower the pollution level and hence the lower their pollution
tax base.
Implication  6:  To achieve their socially desirable  impact  and  to
ensure their political support on the part of the states, subsidies rate
should be set at levels that do not end up reducing states net revenue.17
c.  Should the Federal Government Subsidize the Firm or the SEPA?
Even  if a  state subsidy  is a more desirable  policy than  a federal
subsidy from an economic point of view, non-economic reasons may lead the
federal government to take the leadership and assume the initial costs of
subsidies. In that case, it seems reasonable to discuss the allocation of
federal  resources. Should the Federal government subsidize abatement by the
firms or should it subsidize monitoring by the states?
The  simulations  results  reported  in  Table  3  reflect  a  somewhat
different  institutional  setup  from  the  one  relied  upon  so  far.  The
pollution tax rate has been set arbitrarily at 1%. This is not necessarily
optimal. It represents, however, a realistic situation as it is unlikely
that any government will be able to tax all sectors optimally. While the
federal government was not relying on any penalty to increase the incentive
of SEPAs to monitor, we assume here that the federal government relies on
that instrument  as well and imposes very high penalty--about  30% of the
original sales tax revenue from the polluting sector--when  it finds out
that a SEPA has not been  inspecting polluters. The subsidy rate whether
federal or state and whether to the firm or to the SEPA is 25%.
At these subsidies levels, a federal subsidy to the SEPA leads to a
lower social welfare than a state subsidy to the firm. It is however, more
effective than a  federal subsidy to the firm. Strictly  in terms  of its
effect  on pollution  reduction,  it is however  the less effective of the
three forms of policy intervention even it leads to a perfect monitoring by
the states thanks to the reduction in  the marginal cost of monitoring. From
the states point of view it is probably the most attractive solution as it
leads to its highest net revenue level.  To increase its effectiveness in
terms of pollution reduction, it would have to be combined with an increase
in the pollution  tax rate  as it is a  crucial instrument  to change  the
behavior of the firm and improve its compliance.
Subsidies to the firm lead to significantly lower pollution levels  but
require, for this low tax rate level, an active inspection effort by the
federal government. The state revenue payoff of SEPAs' monitoring efforts
are too  low as compared  to the  full cost of monitoring  because direct
subsidies to the firm tend to reduce the pollution tax base more directly18
and hence the tax revenue. This reduces the marginal benefits of monitoring
from the firm.  In sum, the state prefer monitoring  subsidies because it
tends to increase the average effective tax rate and revenue as compared to
a subsidy to the firm.
Table 3: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal to firms and to SEPAs
(expressed as % of value of a variable
without government intervention unless otherwise specified)
Subsidy  to  firm  Subsidy  to  SEPA
by  SEPA  by  FEPA
Social Welfare Level  105.7%  102.5%  103.7%
Firm's Optimal Behavior
Abatement Investment
as % of Initial Capital  14.4%  12.2%  11.9%
Output Level  94.8%  96.2%  96.4%
Pollution Level  47.1%  55.4%  64.4%
SEPA's optimal Behavior
Minimum Monitoring Rate Needed  7.3%  7.3%  8.9%
for abatement to start
Optimal Monitoring Rate  97.8%  83.6%  100.0%
Nominal Pollution Tax Rate  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%
% cut in VAT Revenue  5.2%  3.8%  3.6%
Pollution Tax Revenue
as % of VAT Revenue  33.4%  33.6%  46.7%
Net Revenue  113.0%  128.9%  142.9%
FEPA's Optimal Behavior
Optimal Inspection Rate  5.0%  15.0%  0.0%
From the FEPA point of view, the ranking of these two policies depends
n the importance of the federal budget constraint. Subsidizing a SEPA is
enerally likely to be significantly cheaper than subsidizing the firm, at
east in the short run. This is because firms' abatement costs tend to be
igher than states monitoring costs but also because an abatement subsidy
ill require  an  active  federal  inspection  effort  which  the  monitoring19
subsidy  does  not  require.  It  is  thus  likely  that,  when  the  budget
constraint is binding, the FEPA will generally tend to prefer a subsidy to
the SEPA over a subsidy to the firm. This explains why in Brazil, as in
many developing countries, a monitoring subsidy may be more desirable than
an abatement subsidy.
From the FEPA perspective, the monitoring subsidy has an additional
attraction.  It  can  be  a  substitute  to  expenditure  to  be  allocated  to
inspecting the states. In the very short run, as the federal guvernment
faces  constraints  imposed the  shortages  of qualified  staff,  monitoring
subsidies may prove to be a very attractive solution to improve the overall
effectiveness of pollution control in Brazil.
Implication  7:  When  both  the  federal  and  the  state  governments
pollution control efforts are, at least partially, determined by budgetary
considerations,  monitoring  subsidies  are  more  desirable  than abatement
subsidies.
5.  Policy Lessons for Brazil
This section attempts to narrow down the desirable path for federal
and state  subsidy policies  in general. The emphasis is on the practical
lessons of the paper. In particular, it highlights the role that subsidies
can have in increasing the variety of combinations of instruments that can
be relied upon to implement pollution control objectives without omitting
growth targets.
Subsidies  in Brazil would  essentially serve three purposes:  (i) if
assigned  to  the  right  government  level,  they  could  reinforce  the
effectiveness of pollution taxes in terms of pollution reduction; (ii)  they
offer an opportunity for additional combinations of instruments and hence
provide  greater  flexibility  in dealing  with  the  specific  institutional
characteristics  of  every  state;  (iii) they  can  serve  a  purely  "public
relations" effect by showing that the federal government does not always
relies on "sticks" but can also provide "carrots".
From a purely economic perspective, the paper has three main messages
of direct  relevance to the Brazilian situation. First,  carrots will  not20
work without a stick. In other words, subsidies--of any type-- will not
work without a coexisting pollution tax. Second, some "carrots" are better
than others at achieving the government's objectives. In general, a state
abatement subsidy is the more effective instrument to be combined with a
pollution tax. However, when federal or state inspection capabilities are
limited, monitoring subsidies can provide an effective substitute. Third,
increases in abatement subsidy rates can be counterproductive. They tend to
increase firm  investment and hence reduce  the pollution  tax base  while
increasing subsidy costs. This can lead to a worsening of the monitoring
and inspection efforts by both the FEPA and the SEPA but as importantly of
their fiscal revenue. In sum, the lesson is that it is more effective to
keep the subsidy rates low if they are to be both effective, sustainable,
and  enjoy  the  necessary  endorsement  from  the  state  or  federal  fiscal
administrations.21
Appendix: A Game Model for Taxes, subsidies and Penalties in Decentralized
Pollution Control
This appendix establishes a  game-theoretical framework which underlies
the interdependence and interaction between behaviors of different levels
of economic agents.  Essentially, we define the problem of assigning and
designing  policy  instruments  for  decentralized  pollution  control  as  a
hierarchical  Stackelberg  game  played  between  three  levels  of  decision
makers: a representative firm, a representative SEPA and the FEPA.
The Firm's Problem
To simplify our presentation without losing much policy insight, we
concentrate on a representative firm in a specific sector of a developing
economy, in which environmental management is decentralized in the sense
that any economic agent is able to decide what to do and how to proceed by
weighing its own gains against its cost when environmental responsibility
is concerned.  As a by-product of its production, the firm emits some toxic
release into the environment.  Since this emission pollutes and is subject
to potential pollution taxes and penalties, the firm may find it in its
interest to purchase certain abatement facilities.  With subsidies  from
either the state authority (the  SEPA) or the federal authority  (the  FEPA),
the  firm  knows  that  its  investment  for  pollution  control,  I,  can  be
presented as
I  =  (I  - s 1 - St)  C,  Sr,  S20,  °  . Sr  + Sf  <1  (I;
where sr  and sf  are the state and federal subsidization rates, respectively,
and C is the market cost of the pollution abatement device.  For any given
abatement device cost, the higher the subsidization rate from either the
SEPA or the FEPA, the smaller the firm's contribution portion.  On the
other hand, for any given set of subsidization rates, the more the firm
invests for pollution control, the larger the abatement facility.  Namely,
(1) can be rewritten as
C-  1  I  (2)
1 - sr  - S
where  1/(1-s,-sf)  works  as  a  subsidization  multiplier  for  the  firm's
environmental protection  investment.  In the short-run, the firm holds a
fixed total capital stock K.  The firm's production function, assumed to be
quadratic in its productive capital K - I, can be written as22
Y  =a  (K  - I)2  + P(K-  I)  + y,  a  < O,  ,  > o  (3)
which can be regarded as a second order Taylor approximation to any twice
differentiable production technology in the concerned neighborhood.  Hiere
a, al  and - are parameters reflecting the firm's production technological
status.  Generally,  we  require  that  a  be  negative  to  ensure  the
concavitivity of the production  function and that A  >  -2aK to ensure a
positive marginal product of capital when I =  0.
Since a part of the capital stock is shifted away for environmental
protection,  investment  for pollution  control reduces  the  firm's  output
level
dY  - (2a.(K-  I)  +  03  <  0  (4)
Pollution intensity in the environment, denoted by P, is positively
correlated with the output level but negatively correlated with the size of
the  pollution  control  facility  C.  Hence,  we  can  write  out  a  general
pollution function as
P  = p(Y,  C)  P1 >  0,  P2 <  0  (5)
where p 1 and P 2 are partial derivatives of P with respect to Y and C.  Due
to the measurement and identification difficulty, the pollution intensity
is  often  linked  to  some  pollution  generating  factors.  Taking  the
productive  capital  as  our measurement  proxy,  we  can,  for  presentation
simplicity, linearize the pollution function as
P  = *  ( K - I  )  - (a C  >  0,  *  2: O,  )  2t 0  (6)
where  0  is  the  capital  pollution  rate  in  terms  of,  e.g.,  pounds  of
pollution  release generated by a  dollar value of capital, and w  is the
abatement rate of the firm's pollution control facility in terms of, e.g.,
pounds of pollution release cleared by a dollar value of  C.  Obviously, the
firm's investment for pollution control reduces the pollution intensity
dIP  X  dI  t  - SrC  - S  0  (7)23
Clearly,  the  larger  the  subsidization  multiplier,  the  larger  the
marginal reduction rate for pollution control investment.  In other words,
government  subsidies  enhance the  abatement  effectiveness  of  the  firm's
pollution control efforts.  This can be seen from
(  Sr  +  sf  di(d)  (1  - Sr  - sf)
2 (8)
The firm has two tax obligations: a VAT at rate ty  and a pollution tax
at a nominal rate tp  but realized only when the SEPA monitors.  For given
K  and tax policy, the  firm maximizes  its expected profit  given  as the
following profit function
H(  I;  K)  I  - ty)  Y  - rK  - 0  tpP  (9)
by selecting its optimal pollution control investment I.  Here 0 in [0,1]
is the SEPA's monitoring frequency and rK is  the firm's fixed capital cost.
The  change  of the  firm's  profit  due  to  changes  in its  investment  for
pollution control can be obtained by using the chain rule
dE  -(1  - t  )  dY  _ 0  tp  dP
dI  Y  dI-  ~  dI
-(1-t.)  [ 2a  (K-  I)  +  I]  +  e tp4  1+-S-Sf]  (10)
The  second  order  condition  for  the  firm's  profit maximization problem
d21I=  2a(1  - t  )  (0  (11)
dIJ2  Y
is satisfied for all possible choice of I.  The first order condition is
then
(1  - ty)  [p1  + 2a(K-I)]  =[4 +  tP  (12)
The firm will invest for environmnental  protection until the marginal
cost in terms of sales loss equals the marginal benefit in terms of the24
pollution tax avoided.  From (12),  we see that the bigger the subsidization
multiplier, the higher the marginal benefit for pollution control and the
more  incentive the  firm will  have  to allocate  funds  for environmental
protection.  For any given policy mix (ty,  tp,  0, se.  st),  the firm's optimal
investment for pollution control is, since 0 < I < K,
r(ty,  tp,  0, s~,  s9)  =max{0,  min  K,  K+  2  2 a  t)  (t I  1  )
(13)
which can be regarded as the firm's best reaction function to the FEPA and
SEPA's tax policies.  The minimum effective pollution rate tax to make the
firm not completely ignore its environmental responsibility is
Bt  >  (1  - ty)(p  +2pK  (14)
qr  +  (a14
1  - sr  - Sf
So we see that a rise in either the state or federal subsidy rate will
require a lower effective pollution tax rate to make the firm aware  its
environmental responsibility.  The  pollution control investment ceiling, at
which pollution  generated by the  firm is completely eliminated,  can be
expressed as
I  ___  ___  ___  _1
K  1  +  (15)
1  Sr  Sf
which  is  completely  determined  by  the  firm's  pollution  and  abatement
intensities, and the government decision on subsidizing pollution control.
Apparently, a higher subsidy rate lowers the pollution control investment
ceiling.
To derive meaningful and interesting  policy implications, we assume an
nterior solution for I in (0,  K).  The consequent capital stock the firm
ill allocate for production is then
K  - I(  ty,I  tp,  0, sr,  s  )  =  2)  (  r  +  (16)
2cL  2a(I1ty  Isr-sE)25
which has a negative correlation with the effective pollution tax rate bu
a positive correlation with the subsidy rates.  The consequent pollution
release  can  be  also  written  as  a  best  reaction  function  to  the
environmental policy mix,
P( ty,  ti, 0,  (I,  srf)  =  4'0J~- (a  I  +(l-+tp  +2
Y'  P'  '  t  f  2a  1  -Sr-Sf  (2a  )2a  (1-ty  ) (t  -sr-sf)
(17)
If the SEPA has a maximum pollution tolerance level, denoted by Pmax,
and a positive  expected  (planned)  monitoring  rate,  E(O)  >  0, the  SEPA will
set  a  pollution  tax  rate  at  least  as  high  as  the  following  "minimum
required pollution tax rate":
E()  (  1-sz-sf)  [1-s-s  +  +  2cP  (18)
The  firm's  reaction  to  changes  of  the  SEPA's  monitoring  can  be
summarized as: an increase in the SEPA's  monitoring rate will (a)  stimulate
the firm to invest more for pollution control, (b) thus reduce the firm's
output level, and (c) cut down the pollution release in the environment.
These are verified by examining the following equations,
ax  2a(1p  qr+  > 0  (19)
.0  2 a  (1  ty)  (t  -Sr-sf)19
aY  dY aI  =  +  [  <0  (20)
ao  - dIao  - 2a 1(1-ty)  ltSr-S)JJ26
lap  +  St  - Sf)  (21)
=  ~~~~~~<  0
08  2a(1  - ty  )
It  is worthwhile  to note that there  exist  equal pollution  tax and
monitoring  elasticities on the investment  for environmental protection,
pollution intensity and output level,
I  axtp  I  8e
_p aP _  aP  =0O  (22)
p  atp  P  (2
X  aY  O aY  I  dY(  p aI  o_  aI  =  o
Y  atp  Y oa  Y dIT  I  atp  I  ae
which means that the same percentage change  in the nominal pollution tax
and in the monitoring rate will have identical policy impact on the firm's
behavior.
The firm will increase its investment for pollution control when the
subsidy rate increases.  Subsidies from the state and from the federal are
equally good.
OXI  =  C1  c.o  0tp  >  0  (23)
aSr  asf  2a  (1-  ty)  (1  - Sr  -St)  2
The size of the firm's pollution  control facility will be enlarged
with a larger subsidy rate, since the firm has more incentive to invest  and
the more it invests, the more subsidies it will get.
aS-  ac  - I  +  1  a-  >  - (24)
as 1 s  (-SrS  f) 
2 l-S 1 Sf  as,27
However, increase of subsidization will reduce the output level,
ay  aY  dY  a  a, 
_Y =  Y=  dYaI  =_- [2a(K-  I)  +  < 0  (25) aSr  0as  dI  - sr  asr
since subsidies attract the firm to invest more for pollution control. S
intuitively,  more  subsidies  reduce  the  pollution  release  in  th
environment.
Or  _  f  &PdPC dsr=  _ [  ( I  - sr  - Sf  )  + @]  <  0  (26)
O3s 1 asf  dC  a3sr  s
Meanwhile,  subsidies  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  SEPA's
monitoring policy
szsf  02alt)(fS)2
|  3S ( d  i)  =  S  (I)  =3  )  2 a  ( 1 - ty )(1  -Sr  -. f)2:  1'~~~  )  --  cJ,tp  ~~~~~~~~(27)
a (OP~  0  =  _  _  _  _  _  _(a  _  _  _  _+  co<  0
sr  a00  ,  aSf(AI  a(1-t  )  (1-s-sf) 2 l-S-Sf)
Although an increase in both the monitoring frequency and the subsidy
rates reinforces  the firm's  incentive for environmental protection,  the
relative effectiveness of  marginal changes in  the monitoring rate (penalty)
and the subsidy rates  (rewards) can be measured as
0  a
Sr  + Sf  sa  - r  +  Sf(  1  )  (28)
I  C3  (Sr  +  Sf)
which can be either greater or less than 1.  It is noticeable that this
policy  effectiveness comparison  is independent of the  firm's production
technology and the authorities' policy mix except their subsidies rates.
In other words,  the  stick  (monitoring) works  more  effectively  than  the
carrots (subsidies) at the margin when
t  >  2  (sr  + Sf)  -1  (29)
<)  [ 1  - (  Sz  +  Sf  )  ]228
This  implies that  the  authority  will  more  likely  to  resort  to  a
harsher monitoring scheme for (a)  dirty industries (where t  is big) or (b)
firms with inefficient  abatement facilities (where  w is small).  Denote the
maximum profit  the firm can achieve by  1I(K, ty  tp,  ,  sr,,  sf),  we can
obtain the following result by using the first order condition
8 (S 1 s*  =  (1-t )  ay  _________P  a  (sr+  1  ty)  aa(sr  +  S)  a  (Sr  +  Sf)
=  Ott  +  1  a  I  I  (30) t4 1 sr  Sf  1  sr  Sf
=  MB( K,  ty,  tp,  0,  S. 1 s.  )  -I  I  > 0
where MB is  the marginal benefit of the investment for pollution control as
presented on the right hand side of (12).  Therefore, the firm will always
have  incentive  to  seek  for  subsidies  whenever  it  is available  if the
effective tax rate is not trivial.
The SEPA's Problem
The  SEPA behaves on the behalf  of the state  (regional) authority,
which cares its net tax revenue presented as
R  =  tyY  + OtpP  - OM + il  [0s,M  - (1  -0) F]  - sC  (31)
where M is the SEPA's monitoring cost, n  is the FEPA's inspection rate, and
sF  is  the federal subsidy rate to the SEPA's monitoring  cost.  Pollution
concerns are assumed to be secondary to the state authority and affect the
SEPA's objective function through the pollution tax, monitoring scheme, and
the  federal  penalty  on  noncompliance  of  the  environmental  law.  In
practice, the tax rates, subsidy rates are legislated by law makers.  The
monitoring cost is fixed.  The SEPA can only use its monitoring frequency
as its decision variable.  The tax variation with respect to changes of 0
is
dR  y  + t  ac
-~  =  +  t~,P  + te,0aP  - Mt  + il  (s.FM  + F) - s~-  (32)29
The second order derivative is
d2R  =  2  2i(  (  0  (33)
dO2 2a(1-t)  T  - -r-f(3
Hence, the second order condition for the SEPA's maximization problem
is satisfied for any  feasible choice  of 0.  Therefore,  the  first order
condition for the SEPA's optimal choice of the monitoring rate is
MCZ,M=  - I  SFM  +  Sr  a  -ty  'y  -t  =  a  F  +  t  P  = MBE  (34)
Substitutions lead to
1 F  5-2a  (l-s)  (1-s-Sf  )2a  1t  1-sr-sfI  2oa(1-t  )  1-s  -
rF+  -P*c  K  _L  +I  2  tp  __C_)
2a 
1 -Sr-SfL  21  2al(1t-yty)  lsrrs)
(35)
The left  hand side of (35)  is  the SEPA's aggregate marginal monitoring
cost,  consisting  of  (a) marginal  monitoring  cost,  (b) marginal  subsidy
cost,  (c) marginal  cost due  to the  reduction of the VAT  base, and  (d)
marginal cost due to the reduction of pollution tax base.  The right hand
side of  (35) is the SEPA's  marginal monitoring  benefit,  including some
potential penalty avoided and some incremental pollution tax levied due to
a harsher monitoring  scheme.  From the balance of the marginal cost and
marginal benefit of the SEPA monitoring, we can express the SEPA's optimal
choice  as  its best reaction  function to the  FEPA's policy  mix  and the
firm's optimal behavior, namely,30
(K+---\+M-'s~+F'srtzQ  +
o  i*+  @  (K+2  ]+  M  -,  (s,M+  2F (l-s 1 -s))(1-tv)  ||
0=max  O, min  1,  2-2i)  (wir  +
2aC(1-ty)  2  (1  - SZ- Sf)
(36)
For the optimal solution for 0  being interior in [0,1], the SEPA has
a positive response to the federal subsidization on monitoring, namely,
ae  2M(-y)  2  >  O
- - 2aTIM(l-t~) 
aSF  p  y  I-sr  Srf)
Meanwhile, the more frequently the FEPA inspects, the more frequently
the SEPA monitors.  This can be seen from
a(  2  cc  (1  -tY)  2 (sFM+F)
=Rn  t2(2-t  )(*+  )2  (38)
From  (37)  and  (38),  we  know  that  subsidies  for  monitoring  and
improvement for inspection share the same qualitative impact on the SEPA's
behavior.  However,  the effectiveness  elasticities of  these  two policy
instruments are different:
SF  0
e  aSF  SFM  <  1  (39)
-e  M +  F 3  F
which implies that only when the penalty for the SEPA's noncompliance of
the environmental  law is insignificant, the  FEPA would  assume  that the
inspection  and  the  subsidy  for  SEPA  monitoring  have  almost  identical
effectiveness  at  margin.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  the  federal
subsidy to SEPA contributes to effectiveness of its inspection scheme,31
8a0  a=  - 2aM(1-ty)Z  >  2
> 0~~~~(0 _85S  Oa^Ii  tp2 (2  - ty  (i2  (40)  ~S 
Other  results  that  were  already  discussed  in  the  earlier  paper
include: (i) the higher the penalty level, the more  frequently the SEPA
monitors, and (ii)  the higher the SEPA monitoring cost, the less frequently
the SEPA monitors, i.e.,
0-  2ail(1-ty) 2 >  0
aF  t2(2-tY)(*+  l  2  (41)
as  - 2a(I-ty) 2 (1-flSF)  <  (
t (2-ty)(  +  @  )  (42)
For given F and SF,  the minimum required FEPA inspection rate to make
the SEPA move is
min  1  [Ptp  +  tp  (K+  +  4  I  f  sr  rnmin s:FM  + F[2a  1  - sz  - sf  2a  2ac(1  - Sr-Sf)  (1  - t) 
The FEPA's Problem
The federal authority is, at large,  growth-oriented and thus cares the
economy's  output  the most.  However,  it has  to face  the pressure  from
taxpayers to preserve the environmental quality, and thus has a disutility
on pollution.  Taking the budgetary constraint into consideration, we can
assume  that  the  federal  authority's  preference  is  represented  by  the
following social welfare function
W(Y,  P)  =  Y  - Ap(Y,  C)  + IL [(n (1-0)F  - OsFM - S_C  - nrm]  (44)a
where  m  is the FEPA's  inspection cost when  an  inspection  is conducted.
Here X  is the marginal disutility of pollution and g  is the multiplier of32
the FEPA's financial constraint.  X can also be interpreted as the FEPA's
marginal substitution rate between the output and pollution,
ay{w  wo  (45)
In the principal-agent relationship between the FEPA and the SEPA, we
can see how the agent's behavior would affect the principal's payoff at any
given FEPA inspection rate, namely,
aw  A  a  +  iP  rlF  - sFM  - Se  - aaoe  LF t aoJ
= - y  +  Sr  Sj  [A - _I  - tTF+  s.-  Sft:p2
2  a(1-tY)t  1-sr-sfJ  l  1-ty]  2a(1-sr-se)  (1-ty)t  1-s
(46)
Two important policy messages are implied by this observation.  When
the SEPA tries  to raise  its monitoring  rate while  the FEPA maintains  a
fixed  inspection  rate,  then  (a) the  both  output  level  and  pollution
intensity in the environment will  be reduced and the FEPA  prefers this
output-pollution trade off only when it has a sufficiently high marginal
(average) disutility on pollution, hence a federal authority with  little
awareness  on  environmental  protection  may  not  necessarily  welcome  a
voluntary SEPA monitoring improvement; and (b) financially, the FEPA will
suffer  from  a  revenue  loss, since marginally  it will  (i) collect  less
penalty  from  the  SEPA  with  improved  compliance,  (ii) assume  a  larger
subsidy to the SEPA's monitoring, and (iii)  fortify its subsidy to the firm
due to a bigger firm investment for pollution control caused by a stricter
SEPA monitoring behavior.
Recall  that  the FEPA  is the upper-most  Stackelberg  leader  in this
multi-level game,  it knows that its decision on inspection will directly
affect the SEPA's policy  making and thus the firm's profit maximization
behavior.  So, we can rewrite the FEPA's objective function as
W(rq)  =  Y[O(tl)]  -AP[O(ii)]  +  p{lr  [1-O(q)]F  - ()sM-  SC[O()  ]  - n  7)33
The first order derivative of the objective function is
dW  - 1X)  a.  +  (I[c-OF  - m  - (qiF +  SrM  +  Sf  ac)  (48)
The second order derivative of the objective function is
d2 WX_  a2y (l  02  0t  =  [j  *  %  +  )2(  0  - <  (0(49)
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Hence the second order condition for the FEPA's maximization problem
is satisfied for all feasible choice of X  in [0,1].  Therefore, the FEPA
has a unique optimal choice of its inspection rate, which can be determined
from the following equation,
ay  ao  an  (m  +  S  ac  ao  +  sFA  =  (  1-0(q)IF-I  aP  ao  (
Intuitively, we see that the FEPA shall set its aggregate marginal
inspection cost equal its aggregate marginal inspection benefit in terms of
pollution intensity reduced and marginal increase of the penalty collected
from the SEPA.  Here, the FEPA's aggregate marginal inspection cost has
five components:  (1)  the direct marginal inspection cost, (2) the marginal
cost  due  to  output  reduction  caused  by  a  tighter  environment  quality
control, (3)  the marginal cost due to the federal subsidy to the firm, (4)
the  marginal cost due to the federal subsidy the SEPA's monitoring, and (5)
the marginal  reduction  in the penalty  collected  from the  SEPA  since  a
higher inspection rate induces a stronger incentive for SEPA to comply the
environmental law.  Taking  (50) as an implicit function relating policy
parameters and the firm's technology and pollution status, we have
81q  = - a3  6  >  O  ~~~~(51)
d 2W
which  implies that  the more  the  FEPA dislikes  the pollution,  the more
frequently the FEPA will inspect the SEPA.  Furthermore,34
=  -O)  F - m  - (nF - SFM  - sf  )  (52)
da 2
which implies that whether or not the rise of the FEPA's shadow price for
budgetary surplus will increase its inspection frequency or not depends on
the  ensuing  financial  result  of  the  FEPA  inspection  scheme.  If  the
subsidization  and  penalty  are  designed  to  generate  a  self-sustainable
inspection  scheme,  then  the  FEPA  can  actually  gain  net  revenue  while
reducing the damage to the environment.  Otherwise, the FEPA's first best
inspection plan will be impeded by its shortage of financial resources.35
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